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HOMICIDE-MURDER WITHOUT IN-
TENT TO KILL.-[Alabama] Defend-
ant and deceased engaged in mu-
tual combat without weapons. They
agreed to fight, and at first each
drew a pocket knife but they later
agreed to and did throw away their
knives and "fought fair" with their
fists only. Deceased died two weeks
later, allegedly as a result of a blow
received over his heart in the battle
with defendant. Defendant was
convicted of murder in the second
degree. On appeal it was argued
that defendant had acted in self-
defense, and no corpus delicti had
been proven by the State, and that
from the facts, the crime of the de-
fendant could at the most be man-
slaughter since he had no intent
,to kill deceased. Held: on appeal,
affirmed. One willingly entering a
fight cannot set up self-defense and
the evidence in the case justified
submitting the question of death to
the jury, whose finding cannot be
disturbed. An intent to kill is not
necessary in second degree murder:
Tennant v. State (Alabama, 1934)
155 So. 885.
The decision on the first two
points of the appeal cannot be criti-
cized for self-defense is not avail-
able to one willingly entering a
fight, and the testimony of expert
witnesses as to the cause of death
of deceased is not to be controverted
here. A discussion of the third de-
fense, however, is in order. The
Alabama statute distinguishes be-
tween first and second degree mur-
der, murder in the second degree
being "every other homicide com-
mitted under such circumstances as
would have constituted murder at
common law" except certain defined
crimes, such as murder by poison,
lying in wait, etc., which constitute
first degree murder. Murder at
common law was killing a human
creature in being against the peace
of the King with malice afore-
thought, express or implied: Beas-
ley v. State (1873) 50 Ala. 149;
1 Wharton "Criminal Law" (12 ed.
1932) §419. So a specific intent to
kill is not necessary for murder in
the second degree in Alabama, and
the decision in the Tennant case is
unimpeachable in so far as it holds
that an intent to kill is not neces-
sary to affirm the defendant's con-
viction. But for a homicide to be
murder, it must have been com-
mitted with malice aforethought:
Roberson v. State (1913) 183 Ala.
43, 62 So. 837; Coates v. State
(1911) 1 Ala. App. 35, 56 So. 6;
Strickland v. State (1907) 151 Ala.
31, 44 So. 90. As was held in an
earlier fight case in Alabama, to
justify a conviction of second de-
gree murder, it must be shown that
the defendant acted wilfully, inten-
tionally, and maliciously: Barnett
[7751
v. State (1927) 21 Ala. App. 646,
111 So. 318.
Malice has been well defined as
an "unjustifiable inexcusable man-
endangering-state-of-mind" includ-
ing either an intent to kill or inflict
great bodily injury, a wanton and
wilful disregard of human life, or,
if the person is engaged in a fel-
ony, a wilful act involving a sub-
stantial element of human risk:
Perkins, "A Re-examination of Mal-
ice Aforethought" (1934) 43 Yale
L. J. 537; and see note in (1934)
25 J. of Crim. Law 454.
In the instant case defendant ad-
mittedly did not intend to kill or
seriously injure deceased. Nor was
defendant engaged in the commis-
sion of a felony. To find malice
then, it is necessary to discover in
his conduct a wanton and wilful
disregard of human life. The man-
ner in which a homicide is com-
mitted is decisive of the degree of
murder: Clarke v. State (1898) 117
Ala. 1, 23 So. 671. In the instant
case defendant discarded his knife
voluntarily, deceased was willing
for the fray, both used their fists
only and fairly, and no discrepancy
in size is. shown to make the fight
unfair. Certainly this is a case for
the application of the rule that "if
the blows causing death are inflicted
with the fist, and there are no ag-
gravating circumstances, the law
will not raise the implication of
malice aforethought, which must
exist to make the crime murder":
People v. Munn (1884) 65 Cal. 211,
3 Pac. 650; see further People v.
Mullen (1908) 7 Cal. App. 547, 94
Pac. 867. Thus admitting that the
court in the Tennant case was right
in holding that no intent to kill is
necessary to constitute murder in
the second degree, the decision can-
not be supported as there is no show-
ing of any malice, express or im-
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plied, on the part of the defendant
and homicide without malice cannot
be murder. It was error to treat
this defendant as if he had walked
up behind deceased and shot him in
the back. (That would be second
degree murder too, not being in-
cluded in the specified acts making
up murder in the first degree.)
In the case of People v. Crenshaw
(1921) 298 Ill. 412, 131 N. E. 576,
the Illinois Supreme Court erred as
badly as did the Alabama court in
the Tennant case, but in the op-
posite direction. The defendant in
the Crenshaw case accosted de-
ceased, a much smaller man, at a
country fair, inquired his name, and
upon learning it said, "for two cents
I'll kill you," and, after the deceased
tried to avoid him, struck deceased
a terrible blow on the head with his
fist, killing him. A conviction of
murder was reversed on the theory
that no malice could be implied from
the use of a bare fist. But malice
may be expressed, and threats are
one evidence of express malice:
McCoy v. People (1898) 175 Il1.
224, 51 N. E. 777. The court re-
lied on People v. Mighell (1912)
254 Ill. 53, 98 N. E. 236 for the
reasoning that there was "no reason
to suppose defendant contemplated
death or serious injury" when he
struck deceased with his fist, which
reasoning was equally applicable to
the Tennant case. But in the Mig-
hell case, as in the Tennant case,
there was no express malice, while
there was express malice in the
Crenshaw case.
State v. John (1903) 172 Mo. 220,
72 S. W. 525, is a ease which prop-
erly affirmed a conviction of mur-
der for a death resulting from a
blow of the fist. The defendant in
that case was a dog catcher. A
crowd gathered early one morning
to watch him in his efforts to catch
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a dog. Defendant became irate,
threatened to kill somebody if they
didn't leave him alone, and then
walked up to deceased, who was un-
offending, struck him, and killed
him. The malice necessary for mur-
der was express in this case just as
in the Crenshaw case, and the
court's decision that it was murder
seems correct. And see People v.
Chutuh (1912) 18 Cal. App. 786,
124 Pac. 566, for a case where the
court properly handled a "fist" case
where there was no malice shown-
the situation found in the Tennant
case. While we read of manslaugh-
ter situations resulting in murder
verdicts and, more often, murder
situations reduced to manslaughter,
most jurisdictions are pretty uni-
form in holding death resulting
from the usaul "fist fight" situation
to be manslaughter only and the
instant case seems to be clearly out
of line in finding malice where there
seemed to be none.
HENRY L. MCINTYRE.
RAPE-AGE OF CONSENT STATUTE
-REVERSIBLE ERRo.--[Tennessee]
Defendant was convicted of statu-
tory rape, the age of consent in
Tennessee being set at twenty-one
years. (Tennessee Code (1932)
§10786.) In two important respects,
the case presented an extreme ap-
plication of this statute: (1) the
female was within thirty days of
the age of twenty-one and (2) she
had been married and had sepa-
rated from her husband. Held: on
appeal, reversed and remanded: El-
kins v. State (1934) 167 Tenn. 546,
72 S. W. (2d) 550.
The purpose of statutes of this
type has been the subject of much
discussion and today the object of
such statutes is pretty well recog-
nized and understood. In the in-
stant case, it is held to be a "stat-
ute again and again declared to
have been enacted for the purpose
of protecting from seduction inno-
cent and immature girls, protecting
them from the wiles of men of
greater experience in sexual af-
fairs" The court, having deter-
mined that the prosecutrix, having
been married, was not within the
class of women for whose benefit
and protection the statute had been
enacted expressed its hesitancy to
apply the statute to the defendant.
All of the statutory exceptions were
examined, but the court, asserting
the inapplicability of those incorpo-
rated therein by the legislature,
held itself unwarranted to add fur-
ther exceptions through judicial
holding. An alleged error in the
charge to the jury upon the theory
of reformation following evidence
of prior illicit acts was finally
seized upon as grounds for reversal.
From a viewpoint of statutory in-
terpretation, the decision is unsatis-
factory and leaves the Tennessee
courts no better fortified to face the
next case arising under this statute.
Professor Baker, in his article
"Reversible Error in Homicide
Cases" (1932) 23 J. Crim. L. 29,
discusses the numerous factors in-
fluencing courts of review when they
are called upon to decide cases on
appeal. It is interesting to note that
although the discussion in the arti-
cle is limited to homicide cases, the
influencing factors there set out are
applicable to almost every type of
criminal proceeding. Such elements
as the personality of the defendant
and the prosecutrix, the circum-
stances involved, the punishment as-
sessed below, the personal emotions
of the judges, the conduct of coun-
sel below, and the condition of the
lower court record constitute power-
ful factors effecting the decision but
allow the formation of a system of
criminal law in which no case will
be settled until it has run the gaunt-
let of appellate emotions.
In the instant case, under the vio-
lated statute, only a few facts need
be proven in order to obtain a con-
viction. These are that the female
was under twenty-one years of age
when the offense was committed,
and that the act did not come within
any of the statutory exceptions
which would exonerate the accused,
such as the existence of a husband
and wife relationship between the
defendant and female in question.
Under such a procedure, the justi-
fiable prosecution may be quickly
dispatched and punishment meted to
the guilty offender. However, where
circumstances exist, as in the instant
case, that are sufficient to deny a
conviction, even though the primary,
fundamental requirements are estab-
lished, it would seem that methods
of reversing exist which may be em-
ployed more easily and beneficially
than by searching the record and
selecting a minor and highly doubt-
ful point of evidence. These meth-
ods are two-fold: (1) that the
Tennessee courts follow the prior
holding of State v. Davidson (1915)
134 Tenn. 482, 184 S. W. 18 (an
abduction case), which held that the
broad term "any female" did not
include married women, and resolve
that the statutory words "a female
over the age of twelve and under
the age of twenty-one years" does
not include feme covert even though
separated from their husband; (2)
that the statutory exception that a
conviction is unwarranted where the
female is "at the time and before
the carnal knowledge, a bawd, lewd,
or kept female," be held satisfied
where prior acts of intercourse are
proven. The second method might
present difficulties of determination
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however for it is a matter of varied
opinion as to when a female becomes
"a bawd, lewd or kept" woman.
Once more judicial emotions would
be brought to play, but such a de-
termination is congiderably more
satisfactory than forcing a search
of the record for technical, high
doubtful, reversible error, especially
where the true reason for reversal
is so apparent and well founded.
CLYDE THEODORE NISSEN.
CRIMINAL LAW-GRAxD JURY-
LEGALITY OF DRAWING UNDER THE
JURORS' AcT AND THE JURY COM-
MISSIONERS AcT.--[Illinois] De-
fendant was indicted, tried and con-
victed of robbery with a gun in the
Criminal Court of Cook Conuty and
sentenced to the penitentiary. On
appeal the sole issue was whether
the trial judge erred in refusing to
quash the indictment, because, as
argued by accused, the grand jury
which found the indictment was
chosen from a panel of 60 persons,
summoned by order of the judge, in-
stead of 23 as the statute specified.
Last February the court reversed the
conviction, but at the April term a
rehearing was allowed. Held: on
rehearing, modified and affirmed (2
judges specially concur, and 3 dis-
sent). The language of the Jurors
Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd,
1933) c. 78 §§1-24) is clear and un-
ambiguous, and definitely fixes the
number of persons to be summoned
at 23. The provisions of this act
are, however, merely directory, and
not mandatory, since the accused has
not shown that the methods used
have deprived him of any sbustantial
legal right. Thus it was not error
to refuse to quash the indictment:
People v. Leiber (1934) 357 Ill.
423, 192 N. E. 331.
At common law the sheriff of
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every county, at the order of the
judge was bound to return to every
"session of the peace, and every
commission of oyer and terminer,
and of general gaol delivery, 24
good and lawful men, or more, out
of the entire county, out of which a
grand jury of not more than 23 was
chosen": 4 Blackstone's Com-
mentaries (15th ed. 1809) 302; 5
Bacon's Abridgement (1854) 310.
Though the precept specified only
24, the sheriff generally returned
48 or more; 2 Hale's "Pleas of the
Crown" (1778) 154; People v. Mc-
Kay (1820) 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 214;
United States v. Mitchell (C. C. A.
9th, 1905) 136 Fed. 896. In the lat-
ter case where the court had before
it the question of the validity of a
grand jury which was impaneled
from a summons for 30 persons, the
indictment returned by a grand jury
of 23 selected from such number
was sustained, and the practice of
calling more than the 23 to be im-
paneled was approved in the interest
of expedition in the organization of
the grand jury. From the above
authorities, and there are many
more, it is plain that at common law
it was immaterial and did not affect
the validity of the grand jury if
more than 23 persons were sum-
moned.
The Illinois Supreme Court in its
opinion recognized the existence of
the common law rule, but said that it
was no longer of any legal signifi-
cance in Illinois, as the legislature
had passed the Jurors Act (supra
at §§9, 16, and 19) and the Jury
Commissioners Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.
(Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 78 §§24-35)
in which the number, qualifications,
and methods of selecting jurors were
dearly specified. It said that the
common law rule had been changed
by the Jurors Act (1) by specifically
limiting the number of jurors to be
summoned at 23, and (2) by taking
away from the judge all power over
summoning the jury panel.
(1) The proposition that the
number to be drawn is limited to
23 rests upon Section 16 of the
Jurors Act (supra), which provides
that a full panel of the grand jury
shall consist of 23 persons, 16 of
whom shall be sufficient to consti-
tute a grand jury. The same ques-
tion presented in the Leiber case
was before a federal court in the
case of United States v. Breeding
(D. C. Va. 1913) 207 Fed. 645. In
the latter case the defendant moved
to quash the indictment on the
grounds that the court had ordered
30 names to be drawn instead of 23
as provided by statute. The federal
statute is quite similar to that of
Illinois in that it provides for a
grand jury panel of "not less than
16 nor more than 23" (U. S. Rev.
Stat. (1878) c. 15 §808) while the
Illinois statute provides that the
panel "shall contain 23 persons." In
discussing the federal statute the
court recognized and approved the
well-recognized principle of con-
struction which forbids an innova-
tion upon the common law unless
the words of the statute clearly re-
quire it (Northern Securities Co.
v. United States (1903) 193 U. S.
197, 24 Sup. Ct. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679),
and held that the above-quoted
phrase was not sufficiently strong to
justify an alteration of the common
law rule. It would seem to follow
that if the words of the federal
statute, which do show some intent
on the part of the legislature to
limit the selection to 23 persons, are
not sufficiently strong to justify an
inroad upon the common law rule,
it could hardly be said that the lan-
guage used in the Illinois statute is
sufficiently prohibitive to show such
an intention.
(2) The Illinois Supreme Court
said that although the presiding
judge may excuse for good cause
any of the 23 which constitutes the
original panel, he has no express or
implied power under the Jurors Act
or Jury Commissioners Act to or-
der more than 23 persons summoned
for grand jury service; and that the
clerk of the court is authorized by
the Jurors Act to select 23 persons
by drawing their names out of a
box provided for that purpose. The
effect of this ruling is that when-
ever a grand jury is required by law
the clerk may ex officio repair to the
jury commissioner's office and there
draw 23 names. But there seems to
be no authority for the clerk's ac-
tion. It cannot be found in the
Jurors' Act, for the only authority
there conferred upon him is to issue
the summons for the 23 persons cer-
tified to him by the county board.
Under the Jury Commissioners Act
"one or more of the judges" is to
certify to the clerk the number of
petit jurors required each month;
and the clerk is then to draw the
number certified, and certify to the
sheriff for summoning the names of
the persons so drawn. Immediately
following is the provision that
"whenever a grand jury is required
by law or by order of court, it shall
be drawn and certified in like man-
ner." The drawing is thus to be
in like manner as in the case of
petit jurors, or in other words the
clerk is authorized to draw names
only upon certification. Further-
more, since by another provision the
judge is impowered to certify the
number "required," it would seem
that he should not be restricted to
23 as the court says the Jurors Act
so restricts him. Here was a clear
intention of the Illinois legislature,
as in the case of "petit jurors," to
leave the fixing of the number to
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"one or more of the judges" as the
needs of judicial business require.
It evidences a clear cut manifesta-
tion of confidence in the judiciary,
and a plain reliance upon it for aid
in accomplishing a clear and free-
moving administration of justice.
Thus to say that the judge has noth-
ing to do with the drawing of per-
sons which will constitute the grand
jury, and that the clerk is author-
ized to select only 23 names from
the box, seems clearly contradictory
to the language and spirit of the
Jury Commissioners Act.
The liberal construction con-
tended for is further supported by
the fact of its application in long
continued usage under the doctrine
of contemperanea exposito. In the
present case the practice of calling
more than 23 persons for grand jury
duty has been followed in Cook
County for over 40 years. In view
of the long established construction
of the statute by the public officiers
called upon to administer it, that
construction should be followed:
Opinion of the Justices (1885) 138
Mass. 601, 7 N. E. 35; People v.
Kipley (1898) 171 II. 44, 49 N. E.
229; Bunn v. People (1867) 45 II.
397; Nye v. Foreman (1905) 215
Ill. 285, 74 N. E. 140; Cook County
v. Healy (1906) 222 Ill. 310, 78 N.
E. 623.
The Illinois Supreme Court es-
caped the administrative difficulties
its decision would have occasioned
by decreeing that even though the
Jurors Act is construed as fixing at
23 the number of grand jurors to
be summoned, the drawing of a
larger number can amount to no
more than a mere irregularity not
affecting the validity of the indict-
ment. It based its finding on two
grounds, namely: (1) Statutory re-
quirements intended for the guid-
ance of officers and designed to se-
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cure order and dispatch in proceed-
ings are not usually regarded as
mandatory unless followed by words
of absolute prohibition; (2) the
provisions of the act are merely
directory and not mandatory since
the accused had not shown that he
was injured in being deprived of any
of his substantial legal rights. The
above rule is generally followed
where the statute fixes the number
of grand jurors to be summoned:
Turner v. State (1886) 78 Ga. 174;
Stevenson v. State (1882) 69 Ga.
68; State v!* Watson (1889) 104 N.
C. 735, 10 S. E. 705; State v. Davis
(1841) 24 N. C. 153; Saunders v.
State (1906) 148 Ala. 603, 41 So.
466; Untreinor v. State (1906) 146
Ala. 26, 41 So. 285; Pybos v. State
(1842) 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 49;
Lowrance v. State (1833) 12 Tenn.
145; Commonwealth v. Wood (1848)
2 Cush. (Mass.) 149; State v. Clark
(1909) 141 Ia. 297, 119 N. W. 719;
Anderson v. State (1843) 5 'Ark.
444; State v. Bachman (1917) 41
Nev. 197, 168 Pac. 733; People v.
Harriott (1856) 3 Park Crim. (N.
Y.) 112. Contra: Leathers v. State
(1853) 26 Miss. 73.
Likewise, with the exception of
one case (Marsh v. People (1907)
226 Ill. 464, 80 N. E. 1006), the
Illinois Supreme Court has followed
the above rule: Beasley v. People
(1878) 89 Il1. 571: Gillespie v. Peo-
ple (1898) 176 Ill. 238, 52 N. E.
250; Blattner v. Dietz (1924) 311
Ill. 445, 143 N. E. 92; People v.
Wallace (1922) 303 Ill. 504, 135 N.
E. 723; People v. Birger (1928)
329 Ill. 352, 160 N. E. 564; People
v. Donaldson (1912) 255 Ill. 19, 99
N. E. 62. In the excepted decision
the grand jury had been selected at
a meeting of the board of supervis-
ors not called in pursuance to the
statute. The court held that the
meeting was not a legal meeting,
that the board had no power to act,
and therefore the selection was il-
legal. The effect of this decision
has been greatly reduced, however,
by later Illinois cases, where the
court has repeatedly held that the
Marsh decision cannot be extended
beyond the facts then before the
court. Thus it cannot be said to be
of controlling authority in the de-
termination of this case. See Peo-
ple v. Donaldson, supra.
Thus in the furtherance of the
purpose of the legislature for an
efficient administration, it seems that
the court should have interpreted
the statute in such a way as to give
the judge wider discretionary pow-
ers in drawing the grand jury in
Cook County. The effect of the
decision is to disregard the terms
of the jury Commissioners Act
which was drawn with special re-
gard for the administrative prob-
lems of the county. Further a grand
jury drawn from a panel of more
than 23 is illegal, and yet a premium
is declared on such illegality by de-
claring the statute merely directory.
Justice Stone, in his specially con-
curring opinion (in which the late
Justice De Young concurred),
pointed out the more desirable path
when he said: "In a county such as
Cook, with a large shifting popula-
tion, it is essential to the expeditious
administration of justice that the
court be permitted to summon more
than 23 prospective jurors, else it
may well be that the grand jury can-
not be impanelel on the first day of
the term as required by law. Such
was the intent of the General As-
sembly in the enactment of the Jury
Commissioners Act. It is true that
for reasons of public expense a
judge should not order a greater
number of jurors than experience
shows necessary to insure the im-
paneling of the grand jury without
delay. The law holds no prohibi-
tion against the return of more than
23 persons from whom a grand jury
is to be selected and the method
followed in this case was not for
that reason contrary to the statute."
FRANK J. MCCABE, JR.
[Although it has not been the
practice to present discussions of
trial court cases, the general inter-
est in the Insull trial and its great
importance justify a short discus-
sion of the issues involved. Students
of criminal law generally depend
upon appellate reports of convictions
and much is lost by ignoring trials
resulting in acquittals. Therefore,
from time to time the JOURNAL will
present discussions of important
trials along with the annotations of
appellate opinions.]
TiE INsULL TRiAL.-Samuel In-
sull and his eighteen original co-
defendants were charged under the
Federal mail fraud statute with hav-
ing "devised a scheme and artifice
to defraud and to obtain money and
other property . . ." from the in-
vesting public by means of the
United States mails in connection
with the sale of allotment certifi-
cates of the Corporation Securities
Company. The true income of Cor-
poration Securities was said to have
been misrepresented. Five major
misrepresentations were alleged:
(1) there was a safety of principal
based upon physical properties;
(2) there was an adequate yield of
six per cent; (3) there was a ninety
per cent holding in five of the ma-
jor concerns of the Insull group;
(4) there was a safe and sound
investment to be found in the com-
mon stock; and (5) there were divi-
dends that would be paid out of
earnings.
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The pre-trial tactics of the de-
fendants were calculated to delay
action and to lay a possible basis
for appeal in case of conviction.
The defendants first filed a plea in
abatement (grand jury defects)
which was followed shortly there-
after by a motion to quash (insuffi-
ciency, vagueness, repugnancy of
the indictment, unconstitutionality of
the mail fraud statute, etc.). These
motions were denied. When Samuel
Insull entered the case he pleaded
to thie jurisdiction _(illegal arrest) to
which a 'government demurrer was
sustained. His motions for a bill
of particulars and a separate trial
were denied. After the case had
been called for trial the court over-
ruled the defendants' challenge to
the array. A jury was impaneled
without unreasonable delay and the
case proceeded to trial.
In order to understand the alleged
scheme to defraud, it is necessary to
obtain some idea of the organization
of the Insull empire. At the top of
the organization were two invest-
ment companies, Insull Utility In-
vestments organized in 1929 (here-
after referred to as IUI), and Cor-
poration Securities Company (here-
after referred to as CS) organized
in 1929. These two investment
companies owned securities in the
other Insull companies in order to
control them. Middle West Utilities
Company was a holding company
which was organized in 1912 (here-
after referred to as MW). The
five major Insull concerns referred
to in the indictment were Common-
wealth Edison Company, (hereafter
referred to as CE), Public Service
Company of Northern Illinois (here-
after referred to as PSCNI), Peo-
ples Gas Light and Coke Company
of which Mr. Insull first became
chairman in 1913 (hereafter re-
ferred to as PGLCC), Midland
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United, and Middle West Utilities
Company, the holding company re-
ferred to above. Utility Securities
Company (hereafter referred to as
US) formed in 1922, was owned by
IUI, CS, CE, PGLCC, PSCNI, and
MW, and was essentially the stock
selling company of the Insull group.
In the alleged scheme to defraud,
the government traced the financial
history of the defendants and their
connections with the Insull com-
panies in such a way as to attribute
fraudulent motives to their actions.
MW in the latter part of 1928 be-
came somewhat of a white elephant
due to inability to meet dividend
payments. In order to effect a re-
organization of MW, the market
price of MW stock was forced above
the 200 mark by Samuel Insull and
Halsey, Stuart & Company (here-
after referred to as HS & C)
through purchases to the extent of
$13,000,000.00, thereby making the
stock attractive to option holders.
In the early part of 1929, IUI was
formed to further insure control of
the Insull companies and a continua-
tion of the Insull policies. Becom-
ing skeptical of the efficacy of IUI
to continue control, due to additional
stock having been sold, CS was or-
ganized in October, 1929. However,
the government charged that this
was not the only purpose for its
formation. To insure the success of
the plan to defraud, it was part of
the scheme for CS to serve as a
dumping place for the $13,000,000.00
of MW stock previously accumu-
lated by Insull and HS & C. The
government alleged that the reason
for the roundabout way of forma-
tion of CS was not to defer income
tax payments primarily, but that it
was to conceal from the public the
true assets of the new CS. The cir-
cular of October 19, 1929, issued to
advertise the sale of CS stock, pur-
ported to say that business would
commence with assets of over $80,-
000,000.00 when in reality all that
was turned in was 304,000 shares
of IUI, one-half of which was pur-
chased from HS & C with borrowed
money. Then to further confound
the public, the 2,000,000 shares of
CS given to SI and HS & C as part
of the consideration for the 304,000
shares of IUI turned into CS, was
placed in a voting trust with Insull,
Stuart, and Insull, Jr. as the voting
trustees. This was done to make
the public think that the defendants
had made a substantial investment
in CS.
The next step was the listing of
700,000 allotment certificates on the
Chicago Stock Exchange as the
"jewels" of the Insull empire and
sale to the investing public at 75.
On the same day of the announce-
ment, Stuart, president of CS and
HS & C and acting for CS, began
buying these units at 100. The gov-
ernment contended that this went
beyond supporting the market as the
units were already in demand. The
subsequent sale of the 1,250,000
shares by US in 1930 further forti-
fied the charges of fictitious sales.
Four methods of "ring around the
rosy" were introduced into evidence.
The court and jury were given vis-
ual education by means of charts
showing the number of times the
Insull companies were on the buy
and sell sides of market transactions
in IUI and CS. Purchases of de-
fe'ndants' stock by themselves,
washed sales (". . . to effect any
transaction in such security which
involves no change in the beneficial
ownership thereof . . . ;" July,
1934, Cumulative Pamphlet, U. S.
C. A. §78(A)), and matched orders
(an order for the purchase of a se-
curity with knowledge that it would
be immediately offset by a sale or-
der entered by or for the same or
different parties: July, 1934, Cumu-
lative Pamphlet, U. S. C. A. §78(B))
were the specific devices used to rig
the market in Insull securities so as
to give it an appearance of activity..
For instance, it was alleged that the
defendants engaged in from 45 to 65
per cent of all transactions in CS
common stock during the period of
1929-1931, inclusive. Further, it was
charged that defendants engaged in
from 65 to 95 per cent of all the
transactions in CS allotment certifi-
cates. These alleged transactions
consisted mainly of purchases, few
sales being made.
More specific allegations of fraud,
however, were made. In addition to
the five major misrepresentations
referred to above, the government
charged that the amount of income
of CS was inflated because of the
methods of CS in receiving stock
dividends as income at market val-
ues, in not charging organization
expenses to earnings, and in deduct-
ing depreciation of approximately
$34,000,000.00 (due to depreciation
in securities held in other Insull
companies) from capital surplus in-
stead of from income. In the circu-
lar re issue of 1,250,000 shares of
CS common stock dated MIV[arch 21,
1930, under the paragraph heading
"Earnings," it was represented:
"The following is a statement of
estimated net earnings for the cal-
endar year 1930. Based upon the
present income from the securities
now owned and five per cent interest
upon the unexpended balance of the
proceeds of this financing:
Net income after de-
ducting all expenses
and taxes .......... $7,106,309.82
Cash dividends on pre-
ferred stock now out-




common stock ...... 4,868,595.32
In the above statement of earnings,
stock dividends received . . . have
been taken at current market prices.
On the above basis the earnings
available for the 4,000,8982 shares
of common stock for the average
time outstanding during 1930 will
be $1.42 per share." The govern-
ment contended that expenditures
would have exceeded income had
proper accounting practices been
followed and that the public was not
taken into the confidence of the de-
fendants. It was pointed out that
eight drafts of this Report were
made before it finally came out.
The practice of receiving stock
dividends into income at market
prices was alleged to be a "nefari-
ous practice" and fraudulent in the
light of the fact that all of the
Insull companies knew the others
were issuing stock dividends at one
price and receiving such into in-
come at inflated market prices. It
was charged the defendants used
this practice to effect a greater dis-
tribution of the stock, and that such
was in no sense income-the equity
of the stockholders not being af-
fected. It was pointed out that such
was contrary to the rulings of the
N. Y. Stock Exchange. Further,
such was a vicious practice inas-
much as the defendants had already
deliberately misled the public by its
market rigging operations in MW,
IUI, and CS stock. The government
attempted to reinforce its case by
proof of the great discrepancy be-
tween the market value of CS and
the liquidating value of the stock
of the companies controlled by CS.
The effect of charging $1,000,
000.00 organization expenses to cap-
ital surplus instead of first against
earned surplus or against earnings
was to state a profit when the de-
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fendants really had a net deficit. In
no case was the amount of the or-
ganization expenses disclosed to the
public and the government argued
that this failure of disclosure was
misleading respecting the true earn-
ings of CS.
The government charged that the
depreciation of assets of CS to the
extent of about $34,000,000.00 on
November 15, 1929, was not shown
in the balance sheet and profit and
loss statement of the Report of 1929
as defendants were afraid that it
would affect the marketability of
their shares. The governiment
argued that this depreciation of se-
curities in the portfolio of CS
should have been charged first to
earned surplus. It was alleged that
all three of the above mentioned
accounting practices were know-
ingly consented to by the defendants
since they were faced with the ne-
cessity of raising around $22,000,-
000.00 of funds during the year of
1930 for MW. A favorable show-
ing of income would aid in this.
Defense counsel depended upon
the character and past deeds of the
defendants since, as was asserted,' it
was inconceivable that the defend-
ants would turn into crooks over-
night. The depression was made
the scapegoat of Insull's downfall.
The real thing on trial was a period
in American finance and not the de-
fendants. The whole question was
one of interpretation, and the gov-
ernment's case was one of con-
jecture and surmise with no positive
and direct proof of fraud sufficient
to overcome the presumption of in-
nocence that the defendants were
entitled to receive. The govern-
ment's case was said to be based on
petty and far-flung inferences built
upon inferences. Criminal intent to
defraud had not been proven. There
could be no temptation for the de-
fendants to depart from a line of
rectitude and truth to steal from
widows and orphans inasmuch as
their success depended upon the
continued confidence of the invest-
ing public.
In answer to the charge of mis-
leading the public as to the value of
MW when its stock was raised from
160 to over 500 by $13,000,000.00 of
purchases, the defense countered by
saying that the same result could
have been accomplished with $100,-
000.00 with the right sort of pub-
licity. The roundabout manner of
forming CS was to defer income
tax payments and to continue con-
trol by Insull. The motives of the
defendants were not to deceive the
public for CS was not used as a
dumping ground for the $13,000,-
000.00 acquisition of MW by Insull
and HS & C. If the defendants had
wanted to dump, why did they not do
so on the public queried the defense?
The circular of October 19, 1929
(relative to the $80,000,000.00 of as-
sets that CS would start business
with) was clear in meaning that such
would be the amount when subscrip-
tions were paid in. The voting trust
set up in CS to insure control by
the Insull interests was not a device
to enable the defendants to further
mislead the public as Insull never
withdrew his contribution, nor made
great personal profit.
Respecting market rigging, defense
counsel asserted it had always been
the practice of the Insull companies
to maintain a secondary market for
dissatisfied purchasers and to sup-
port the market in an orderly way.
The rules of the stock exchange re-
quired stock market support both
before and after the issuance of
stock. It was asserted that value
could only be based upon market
price and that the use of market
value had a place in finance which
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was not of a fraudulent nature. Re-
garding the allegations of the use
of washed sales to inflate the value
of the stocks, defendants declared
that such was an assumption from
the books and accounts with which
the government had not connected
the defendants. Matched orders
were admitted and justified by the
defendants as a device for securing
an orderly market. It was asserted
that the percentage of such transac-
tions engaged in by the Insull com-
panies to the total transactions in
Insull companies was too high by
one-half and that the public had a
larger share in the trading than the
government would admit since the
government had counted sales re-
gardless of whether the Insull com-
panies were on the buy or sell side
of the transaction. Such wash sales
were declared to be only one per
cent of the total US transactions.
Concerning the five major mis-
representations, the defense at-
tempted to meet them by counter-
assertions of no fraud. Of the
ninety per cent of holdings in the
five major Insull concerns, it was
declared that the indictment was in-
correct in limiting itself to CS since
the statement in the booklet referred
to both the holdings of CS and IUI.
There was no fraudulent misrepre-
sentation in saying there was a
safety of principal in the physical
properties back of the securities held
by CS or US since investment com-
panies, as such, never own physical
properties. The attractive yield of
six per cent was always stated to be
in stock dividends. Respecting the
representation that CS was a safe
and sound investment and the best
buy on the market, defendants de-
clared that the word "safe" was
never used in the circular and that
they thought it was a good invest-
ment, but they never said it was
the best buy. Regarding the state-
ment that dividends would be paid
from earnings, the defense asserted
that they were so paid.
The defense had the most diffi-
culty in justifying its accounting
practices. The government had
charged that in circulars and in an-
nual statements CS had been rep-
resented to have income when actu-
ally there was a loss. In reply to
this allegation that the receipt of
stock dividends at their market value
misled the investing public as to its
income, the defense was that the
intrinsic value of the stock was at
least as high as market value and
the latter was the only satisfactory
measure of value. Accounting was
described as an inexact science and
to fail to mention stock dividends
as income would be to conceal more
than if they were taken in as in-
come. The federal Securities Act
of 1933 allowed receipt of such divi-
dends as income at their market
value if it was stated separately.
(The government argued, however,
that the Act did not condone the
practice but merely recognized it as
a means by which the Securities
Commission could be informed of
the disposition of stock dividends.)
This was asserted to have been done
in the 1929 Report. To further
throw doubt in the minds of the
jury as to whether there was any
fraud, the defense resorted to the
expedient of showing how the $10.00
original stock dividend instead of
going to $518.62 went below $10.00
to $7.55 by taking a different date
when the market value was low. It
was declared illogical not to treat
stock dividends as income and de-
fense counsel asserted that even if
the government were correct in its
accounting theory, defendants only
published their ignorance.
Respecting the charging off of or-
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ganization expenses to capital sur-
plus instead of first to income or
earned surplus, defense counsel ar-
gued that there was no deception as
to what the income was since the
1929 Report showed (however, with-
out the amount) that such was
charged to capital surplus.' Defense
counsel stressed the admissions of
both Messrs. Huling and Kester, ex-
pert accounting witnesses for the
government, that the proper ac-
counting practice was controversial
and brought in four C. P. A.'s to
justify the defendants' way of treat-
ing organization expenses.
Concerning the defendants' treat-
ment of depreciation, the defendants
declared that it was not necessary
for explanations to accompany all
reports subsequent to the event of
depreciation. In the 1929 Report
at p. 6 such was shown to be
charged to paid-in surplus. Defense
counsel pointed out that Mr. Huling
admitted on cross-examination that
appreciation should not be credited
to income and queried why charging
of depreciation might be necessary
when an investment company's port-
folio depreciated.
The frequent drafts before state-
ments were finally issued were only
customary and something in addi-
tion was necessary before fraud
could be made out. The defendants
only represented what in the judg-
ment of the directors and commit-
tees was an honest statement of the
condition of CS.
The enormous mass of conflicting
and exceedingly complex evidence
was then given the jury after what
were considered by both prosecution
and defense as fair instructions by
Judge Wilkerson. A two-hour de-
liberation was sufficient for the jury
to digest the evidence and reach
their verdict vindicating the busi-
ness practices of Insull and his as-
sociates. It has been suggested that
this was a result of the emotional
appeal of the defendants and the
complexity of the evidence. This,
however, is a matter of conjecture.
ORBA F. TRAYLOR.
